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October 14 生子当如乔致庸 为官应若朱镕基我只希望这篇文章不会被和谐掉 ~~~~ 朱总理希望您晚年幸福 仅此而已!
自从阅兵过后,校内以我为首有很多朋友分享朱镕基总理-朱爷爷的相册,打开却不见相片.在众多爱国校友的咒骂质疑之中,又发现有心同学另建相册,相片暂时 还未被封掉.很感动.之后在百度搜索朱总理信息,才发现不仅仅是校内做这种事情,百度里也只有朱镕基总理生平介绍以及泛泛的信息.关于昨天阅兵仪式很多人 看到了朱总理的讨论,几个论坛都把相关帖子删除,我很想知道,凭什么?为什么?
一代领导人,卸任之后就容得这样霸道对待.恐怕,这样也只是对朱总理.
摘几段在网上看到网友写的:
总理长的很英挺,给人的第一印象很伟岸.
曾经他亲手批示过远华特大走私案,就是当年中国2/3的外烟都靠他走私的人赖昌星,甚至走私飞机大炮. 听说在总理当年就职上海市长说过的一段话感化过,意思大致如下:"我是个孤儿,从小没有父母,我不怕得罪人!" 时至如今,我深深再一次体会到总理的伟岸. 但是事与愿违,在当今这个社会,利益永远是排在第一位的. 单凭个人,永远只是冰山一角,更不会... 渐渐的得罪的人多了,损害了很多高层资本的利益,他们决心除掉他. 当年内幕,在一个很深的夜晚,军用机接走了朱总理的一家. . 如果朱总理在位到现在,恐怕中国比现在更强大和繁荣. 温总理也不错,很关心人民,但是从长远的发展来看,这往往是不够的. (1)在朱鎔基内阁的最后一段时间中,在中国证券市场上发生了一件非常有意义的事情. 这就是众所周知的国有股减持事件.对于很少教条思想并经常对经济学家冷嘲热讽的朱鎔基来说,他推动国有股减持并不象经济学家“窃”以为的那样是为了完善公司治理结构,而是有着十分实用的目的:为社会保障资金筹集资金。从他在这个问题上的热心及坚决表态上看,朱鎔基显然已经意识到了中国社会保障问题紧迫性. (2)但这个过程在中国股市中激起了巨大的反弹.仅仅半年之后,朱就以“本届政府任期已经有限“为由,决定将国有股减持问题留给下一届政府。如果说 90 年代中期朱鎔基的政策还是在下面遇到抵制的话,那么在他任期的最后阶段,他的政策似乎已经很难走出中南海了.这无异于表明,一个不断制造社会问题的体制正在不由分说的剥夺中国领导人解决这些问题的能力,改革的方向盘已经易手. (3)早在2000年的记者招待会上,这位总理就已经露骨的抒发了他的无力感,他说,“我只希望在我卸任之后,全国人民能说一句,他是一个清官,不是贪官,我就很满意了。如果他们再慷慨一点,说朱鎔基还是办了一点实事,我就谢天谢地了”在一如既往的幽默与谦虚中,朱显然没有克制住他对体制的无奈。一位现代中国的总理,最高的自我期许仅仅是“作一个清官”,足以反衬中国政治的真实现状. 想起他的一句话,我准备了100口棺材,99口是留给贪官的,另一口是留给自己的,看来,事实也就如此。把改革既希望于个人,本身就是最大的讽刺。 他得罪了很多领导(得罪了领导们的一己之利),他自己也说了,“我下台之后这些国务院的各政府部长可能会报复我,说不定我现在讲话下边的人就恨我呢,”这是我在网上瞎溜达看到的视频,当他说完这句话的时候,下面的各部部长表情那个奇怪啊。连央行行长都被他当面骂过,尽管事后去给人家道歉,但这也给他以后留下了隐患。 哈哈,好人总是这样啊!想当年,朱镕基总理意气风发,想干一番事业来,好好整治中国.可惜,他如同我等 有心报国,却报国无门! ------------------------------------------ 为什么长达66分钟的阅兵式上我们都捕捉到了那短暂的一秒? 长达66分钟的阅兵式 有整齐划一的正步走 有让无数人留恋“垂涎”的漂亮女兵 有朝气蓬勃的少先队员 有形式各样的花车** 可让无数人为之动容的 却是那一秒一闪而过的镜头 那一位偏安一隅安静恬淡的老人 那一位戴着墨镜白发苍苍的前总理 那一位独自凭栏的孤独者 铺天盖地的文章与照片再次覆盖了整个网络 央视一定很奇怪 为什么仅仅一秒只有一秒的时间 朱镕基就可以获得比出镜率如此之高的***甚至胡锦涛温家宝更多的关注 不知有多少观众和我一样 在听到康辉说“胡锦涛、***”时就开始等待着“朱镕基”三个字的出现 在看到JIANG后开始焦急地找寻朱镕基的身影 我们耐心地等着 直到李瑞环、尉健行都已相继出现 我们等不及地问着身边的人 朱镕基呢 你看见了吗 央视导播不知道 如果他活在百姓心中 位置的前后 时间的长短 都无法减退人民对于他的爱戴之情 于是 镜头短暂地停留了一秒 随后一闪而过 其实这一秒 同时给了三个人 可我 却在看到他满头银发之时眼圈一热心头一震 我们是年轻的80、90后 没有经历过文革的血雨腥风 无法体会当年十里长街送总理的心情 只知道周恩来曾经在那个动荡的年代以一己之力挽救了许多革命者 没有经历过改革开放的浪潮和经济特区的巨变 无法体会那句亲切的“小平你好”寄托着人民怎样的感情 只知道邓小平拯救了濒临瘫痪的中国经济 可我们 恰恰都是沐浴在朱镕基的阳光雨露中成长的 从某种意义上说 我们就像是温室里的花朵 经历着新中国建国以来最稳步快速发展的二十年 而这二十年 恰恰是这位现已白发苍苍的老人呕心沥血的岁月 我不是经济学家 我也不懂得高深的经济学知识 但是我出生在朱镕基上任之初 亲身经历着他所带来的巨变 我只记得 小时候妈妈的工资仅仅是几十块一月 03年温接手时以可以以千为单位衡量 在朱任上 很多百姓的工资都翻了近二十倍 我只记得 03年时 也是有很多人买不起房子 可那时候很多工薪阶层并无买房之忧 而现在 买房已成为很多人心头的一块病 我只记得 十岁生日时 听到街上市民口中骂朱的声音不断 随后才知 因为他的铁腕严厉 很多只食俸禄不做事实的国企员工被迫下岗 我只记得 初中时 张昌龄老师曾在地理课上说 堂堂一国总理 在九江决堤后 对着政府官员直言大骂是王八蛋工程 而他的形象没有因为这几个脏字有丝毫损毁 我只记得 温文尔雅的温家宝接任总理之时 家人的许多亲朋好友来家做客时无不潸然落泪 就好像自己的一位亲人即将离家远行一般 我只记得 04年暑假去北京 汽车经过朱镕基住宅时 身边一位同行者对他老婆说 朱卸任后 很多人都试图暗杀他 他的生活比在任时还要艰难 我只记得 07年暑假 一位以色列人对我说 “Most foreigners deem that *** is a vase, but ZRJ is a miracle.” 我只知道 书店的《朱镕基答记者问》在书店已多次卖到脱货 我买的一本正在被家中多人传阅 人歇书不歇 如果有幸 我能活到60岁 在新中国百年华诞之际 我多么希望会有人像记住开国总理周恩来一样记住朱镕基 是他 让中国经济真正强了起来 是他 曾经把中国带上了一条正确的轨迹 如果有幸 我多希望在那时 有许多和我一样白发苍苍的老人相聚在首都北京 在这座国际化大都市中感受身为中国人的骄傲 在心底默念对于朱总理的缅怀之情 如果有幸 我多希望60岁时 对膝下儿女子孙淡淡历数朱镕基曾经做过的每一件事实 曾经整治过的每一位贪官 曾经铿锵有力说过的每一句豪言壮语 如果有幸 我多希望那时 已历经百年沧桑的中国可以让这位祖国功臣青史留名 可以给予他公正的评价和更多的赞誉 可以正视他的功勋伟业 如果有幸 我多希望 像朱镕基一样活着 你可以用权力抑或手腕打压限制他 可他过人的才华令古今中外震撼 他廉洁无私的内心让千万百姓惦念 生子当如乔致庸 为官应若朱镕基!! June 26 解码京东
4月7日,销售额1140万元。 极大的吸引力,而对传统渠道商则是致命的杀伤力。 March 31 PROFIT:一个目前已经不再使用的古老词汇一年前苏格兰皇家银行并购荷兰银行花了1000亿美元。 一年后的今天同样的价格可以买下花旗银行(225亿美元),摩根史丹利(105亿美元),高盛(210亿美元),美林(123亿美元),德意志银行(130亿美元),巴克莱银行(127亿美元),还能剩下80亿美元的零头,用这点钱你还可以买下通用汽车,福特汽车,克莱斯勒和F1车队。 March 03 曹仁超:领读股市30年通史1950-1980年,香港第一个30年。 February 26 导致华尔街灾难的模型Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street 本期《连线杂志》介绍了近乎荒诞、且另美国和全球金融体系摇摇欲坠的事件:所有全球金融精英人士对一个中国人构建的金融计量模型几乎像圣经一样顶礼膜拜,但精英们忘却了模型的限制条件的警告,最终使它失效,他们也付出了可怕的代价。 February 24 萧功秦:为什么我们缺少特立独行的人生态度一 February 06 特转:砍零大赛津元屡创世界纪录全过程,有钱没钱都进来烧香!贫富差距大?从头再来,不行?再洗一遍! February 05 一分钟带你进入十次元的世界第零次元:点 January 16 买火车票最具爱心规定: === 一个男人问街边小姐:包夜多少钱?回:200元。再问:是不是怎么样都行?回:是!男的大喜:今晚你帮我到火车站排队买张火车票去 === 沁园春·买票 January 13 近期资金持续流入香港原因探析大家都会留意到金管局向银行同业市场注资不断增加,而这些流动资金是以总结余的形式注入。总结余是指持牌银行在金管局持有而记入外汇基金账目的结算户口总额,目的是用作结算银行同业之间的收支交易。于2008年底,总结余为1,580亿港元,相当于2004年550亿港元旧有纪录的接近3倍。当年由于市场预期人民币汇率将会引入更大灵活性,带动港元兑美元上升,因此吸引大量投机性资金流入。
香港金融管理局总裁 任志刚 December 22 有中国特色的击溃海盗方式新加坡内阁资政李光耀几天前在中华总商会、中国驻新加坡大使馆以及通商中国联办的“中国改革开放30年回顾与展望”的对话会上,提到一个故事,说的是新加坡在苏州的一位官员在和中国官员聊天时,对方问他:你的国家有多大岁数了?你要教我怎么做事?我的国家已经有5000年历史了。 这其中的问答体现出中国人的一种国民特色。历史课本中数千年的记载以及地理课本中的地大物博,不断强化国民在这一领域的优越感和自豪感,于是在对外交往中很自然而然地体现。 一个国家有其自身的政治、历史和文化,历经多年形成的教育方式、价值观,往往会在关键时刻成为指导民众行为的深层原因,这也是人们常说的国民性格。 这些性格组成了这一民族和国家社会变革的基础,任何社会政策或是对国家发展的判断,都不能不考虑到这一因素。因为,在那电光火石的刹那,决定其抉择的,就可能正是根植于内心的特色。 几天前中国货轮击退索马里海盗的事件,其中也看得到“中国特色”的影子。12月17日,中国交通建设集团总公司所属的6万吨级特大件运输船“振华4”轮,从苏丹卸货后返航上海,驶入亚丁湾水域后发现海盗踪迹。 手无任何现代兵器的中国货轮船员,经过4个多小时的激战,最终在马来西亚军舰的援助下,逼退了手持火箭筒、冲锋枪、重机枪的索马里海盗,成为今年国际上遭遇劫持的轮船中经过激烈战斗成功战胜海盗的第一例。而能够周旋如此长久,靠的就是自制的200多枚燃烧弹和船上的高压水龙。中国船员的表现确实有些不可思议。 首先,这一批从来没有上过战场、没有摸过枪支弹药的船员,面对荷枪实弹的海盗,却依然针锋相对,这种价值观和很多国家大不一样。 索马里海盗目的在劫船勒索,而不是杀人,这也是之前屡屡得手的原因。那些手无寸铁的商用民用船只,在面对装备精良的海盗时,只能放弃抵抗,等待救赎,这其中并不涉国家尊严。 但中国船员的集体意识、对国家资产的保护意识,让他们在存有抵抗可能性的情况下,绝不束手就擒。 同时,在组织实施反击的过程中,所采用的战术很有些中国课本中经常提到的“地道战”、“游击战”的踪影。虽然没有实战经验,但中国教育制度下的学生对战争却是一点也不陌生的。 历史课本中就详细陈述了当年共产党如何依靠“小米加步枪”的落后军备打败“飞机加大炮”美式装备的国民党部队,如今船员以自制的土武器与海盗周旋,高压水枪的海水源源不绝,自制的燃烧弹以及自用的酒瓶、水杯、饭碗都成了武器,从船员藏身的各个隐蔽点投掷到甲板上,就这样如此简陋、如此原始地对抗穷凶极恶又有精良装备的专业海盗。 然而,原始简陋却可能发挥最基本的作用,甲板上到处都是的玻璃碎片令光脚的海盗寸步难行。以前中国有民谚说“光脚的不怕穿鞋的”,形容没有牵挂、没有顾忌的人比那些有所牵挂、有所顾忌的人要占有心理上的优势。 这批光脚的海盗之前屡试不爽,也正是因为如此,一直食髓知味、以小博大,令对方投鼠忌器,被迫以利益进行交换。 然而,这次海盗在中国船员面前却折戟沉沙,“光脚的”狼狈不已,在玻璃碎片面前请求船员提供鞋子,才能离开甲板。国际海事局打击海盗信息中心的负责人后来对记者说,“实际上我非常惊讶于船员如何想到要阻止海盗。我不知道他们是如何做到的,但他们确实成功了。” 据“振华4”的船长后来向中国记者描述说:“海盗中的几个人走之前,还对我们竖起大拇指,意思大概是,你们牛,我们搞不过你们!”海盗的无奈,其实彰显了对中国船员不怕死的震惊。 下月10号“振华4”回到上海的时候,可想而知,一定会受到热烈的欢迎,乃至表彰。这种英勇是值得钦佩,但如果赞誉上升到维护国家利益和国家尊严的高度,甚至被颂扬为一种典范,这样的“中国特色”倒不令人意外。 这批中国船员的抵抗中体现出比较显著的特色和智慧,如果放而大之,其实也在某种程度上显示出中国人性格积极的一面,即经常不拘一格、敢试敢拼,往往可以因此闯荡出一番天地。 不妄自菲薄于自身的落后,不迷信于先进和精良的设备,土办法往往照样解决问题。中国改革开放30年来摸着石头过河,诸多政策的试点和落实,不正是往往起始于粗糙?发萌于不羁? December 21 69岁老人靠补助金度日 自称为了“不愁吃穿”在北京站持刀抢劫69岁老人靠补助金度日 自称为了“不愁吃穿”在北京站持刀抢劫 终于进了看守所:我在这儿挺好的已经胖了10斤 December 19 什么是经济学家?▉为什么发明了占卜? 这样就可以让经济学成为合理的科学。 ▉要多少个经济学家才能把一个坏灯泡换掉? 八个。一个把灯泡装上,其他的人负责保持的东西(条件)不变。 ▉要多少个经济学家才能把一个坏灯泡换掉? 一个也不用。要是灯泡坏了,市场机制自然会把它更换。 ▉要多少个经济学家才能把一个坏灯泡换掉? 只有一个。他肯定是喝醉了。 ▉要多少个经济学家才能把一个坏灯泡换掉? 两个。一个去证明梯子的存在,另一个换灯泡。 ▉什么是经济学家? 一种失败的数学家,试着去预测澳大利亚的袋鼠数量,但却从不问袋鼠是什么的人。 ▉你能告诉我经济学家什么时候会撒谎吗? 他们嘴唇在动的时候。 ▉经济学家是干什么事的? 短期内做很多事,但长期而言一事无成。 ▉数学和经济学的分别是什么? 数学难以理解;经济学则莫名其妙。 ▉为什么上帝创造了经济学家? 为了让天气预报显得很准确。 December 17 小朋友的日记3月5日 星期日 晴 December 09 转载:指数期货 一寸长、一寸强!还有不足四周,2008年便成为历史,北美市场还有十六天半交易日,整年的大局已有定案。要把对冲基金「收档」的,自9月15日雷曼事件后什么也变得清晰,新资金难寻!传统或对冲基金行业最「迷人」之处,是只要有新资金,很容易又可从头再来,但在核子寒冬下,谈何容易? October 13 童言无忌1、为什么动画片《猫和老鼠》里的老鼠要比猫厉害? September 30 被公鸡欺负过的童年作者:独自行走de猫 回复日期:2005-4-10 0:36:00 作者:悠悠晴天 回复日期:2005-4-8 15:05:00 作者:新兵马强 回复日期:2008-9-29 4:15:27 作者:ainiquebuganshuo 回复日期:2008-9-29 4:34:14 作者:有痔者事竟成1 回复日期:2008-9-29 8:17:15 作者:又酸又苦 回复日期:2008-9-29 10:00:36 作者:panliang9 回复日期:2008-9-29 16:11:22 July 21 关于空姐 1、(登机中,空姐MM在机门口迎客,上来一位帅哥……) June 11 CFTC at the heart of the storm请勿转载 THE LIMITS OF FREE MARKETS Freedom to contract (offer and acceptance, subject to the exchange of consideration, intention to create legal relations, and the observation of certain formalities) is central to the western legal tradition and the basis for the market economy. Freedom to contract is crucial to economic and individual freedom and generally accepted to produce superior outcomes for society as a whole than the alternatives (central planning, slavery or serfdom). But the basic principle has always been qualified by restrictions with prohibit, modify or refuse to give legal effect to certain contracts and contract terms which the public authorities believe are inconsistent with other social objectives: (a) The bible contains (legal) provisions on the remission of debts which interfere with freedom of contract -- and which have been incorporated into modern legal systems in the law of bankruptcy (which discharges individuals from their contractual obligations in certain circumstances). (b) Medieval sovereigns introduced all sorts of restrictions on contract terms. King Edward III's Statute of Labourers (1351) banned employers from raising wage rates and required that food must be priced without an excess profit as the king tried to contain wage and price pressures in the aftermath of the Black Death -- which reduced the population (and labour force) by a third in the middle of the fourteenth century and resulted in a sharp increase in wage demands. (c) By the end of the nineteenth century, many more exceptions to the freedom of contract had been introduced: banning or severely restricting child labour and indentured labour; nullifying some types of restrictive covenenants on land and other property; requiring payment of minimum wages and regulating maximum hours worked; outlawing payment in kind and use of "company stores"; and stipulating minimum standards for foodstuffs and other products. Freedom to contract is fundamental -- but it has never been an absolute right. The last decade of the nineteenth century and the first four decades of the twentieth century saw two more very significant restrictions on the freedom to contract: (1) Competition law severely restricts the right to buy and sell businesses where it would result in a substantial increase in market concentration, and also restricts the type of contractual terms which suppliers may impose on buyers. The Sherman Antitrust Act (1890) was a response to the rapid industrialisation and social change in the late nineteenth century which saw the emergence of new industries in the United States (ie railroads, steelmaking and petroleum refining). The early years were characterised by frenzied, often chaotic competition, and massive overbuilding as various small entrepreneurs rushed to establish new businesses and capture market share. By century's end, these industries had been consolidated into a series of hugely powerful and profitable "trusts". Most famous was the mighty Standard Oil owned by the Rockefeller family which controlled 91% of production and 85% of final sales in 1904. The populist backlash against this concentration of power and wealth led to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 and the US Supreme Court finally ordered Standard Oil's break up in a landmark decision in 1911. The new "competition law" created by the Sherman Act and the 1911 Standard Oil ruling was stiffened by the Clayton Act in 1914 and a series of other new laws passed in the 1920s and 1930s. The key point is that these interfered with freedom to contract by prohibiting the acquisition of monopoly positions through certain business combations, and prohibited certain sales practices such as resale price maintenance and tying, that would otherwise have been perfectly legal if negotiated between buyer and seller. (2) Securities laws (the Grain Futures Act 1922, the Securities Act 1933 and the Commodity Exchange Act 1936, with subsequent amendments) also restrict trading in securities and commodity futures in various ways to prevent fraud, insider dealing, attempts to dominate or otherwise manipulate markets, and limit the acquisition of dominant positions. Again the key point is that each represents a restriction on the basic freedom to contract. No one is forced to buy or sell a security at any given price in a public market. For every buyer there is a willing seller, and vice versa. But the government restricts certain types of transactions, limiting the size of positions that can be amassed. In both cases, Congress rejected the argument that free markets were self-regulating and self-correcting, in favour of the idea that some minimum government regulation was needed to ensure that markets remained free and competitive. The basic idea was to enable free markets within a framework of laws intended to ensure that markets remained free and competitive. Reformers saw this as regulation with the grain of the free market, not against it. THE INTELLECTUAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION The competition and securities laws laid down in the era of Populism and during the Great Depression provided the framework for much of the federal government's economic regulation between 1945 and 1975. They became part of the dominant economic paradigm -- which included a much more expansive role for government than previously, including the provision of a minimum safety net through Social Security and Medicare, and a much greater role for the government in stabilising the economy through monetary and fiscal policy. But these infringements of freedom to contract were never free from controversy. Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter laid the foundation for the counter-revolution by promulgating his theory of "creative destruction". Economic progress was driven by a series of temporary monopolies, as businesses sought to create new inventions and exploit dominant positions to make huge profits. It was the existence of these "excessive" profits that created the incentive for rival firms to develop competing innovations and rival businesses. Monopoly profits would be transient. By the late 1970s, the counter-revolution in the antitrust law was gathering pace as part of a broader attempt to roll back the position of the government and increase the scope for the free market, which was given intellectual expression by Prof Milton Friedman, Martin Feldstein and the young Alan Greenspan, among others, and political expression by President Ronald Reagan. From the mid-1980s onwards, the federal government's enforcement of antitrust laws began to change. While the statutes remained unaltered, the government's interpretation and enforcement of them changed radically in a way that was far more congenial to large business combinations. The intellectual counter-revolution gathered pace throughout the 1980s and 1990s, reaching its apogee last year: (a) Despite high-profile proceedings against companies such as Microsoft, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department has generally adopted a more relaxed approach to mergers, permitting mergers and market positions that would hitherto have drawn legal action. Antitrust enforcers have placed increased emphasis on the concept of technological innovation and market "contestability" -- rather than actual "competition" per se. In this view, even a very large market share may not give a company monopoly power to raise prices or act to the detriment of consumers if the possibility of technological innovation exists, and other businesses COULD enter the market -- now or in future. The idea of markets being "contestable" means that the existence of POTENTIAL competitors may restrain the behaviour of monopolists just as much as the existence of ACTUAL ones. Even a market share of 100% need not give a business "monopoly power" to raise prices if the market remains contestable. (b) The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernisation Act 1999 repealed certain key provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act 1933 -- notably those preventing a single institution from performing both investment banking and commercial banking functions. Proponents of reform argued that the restriction had become outdated and that a single institution could rely on internal "Chinese Walls" and risk controls to manage and reduce conflicts of interest. (c) The Commodity Futures Modernisation Act of 2000 exempted over-the-counter energy trading and trading on electronic commodity markets from the same oversight and position limits imposed on other markets by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The CFTC's attempt to extend its normal regulatory regime to the OTC energy markets under Chairwoman Brooksley Born drew an unusually sharp response from the Federal Reserve, the United States Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The CFTC was forced to back down and the Futures Modernisation Act specifically banned the CFTC from trying to subject these markets to the same oversight and control process which applied to NYMEX and other exchanges. (d) In a landmark ruling handed down by liberal Justice Stephen Breyer in 2006, the US Supreme Court reversed its earlier tradition of jurisprudence and concluded that contractual arrangements "tying" the purchase of one item to another were not automatically illegal per se but should be analysed on a case by case basis in terms of their effects for the consumer. As Breyer noted, "{the presumption that a patent confers market power] is a vestige of the Court's historical distrust of tying arrangements that we address squarely today … Over the years, however, this Court's strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially diminished". In another departure, he went on to note "While price discrimination may provide evidence of market power … it is generally recognised that it also occurs in fully competitive markets" and "Our review is informed by … a change in position by the relevant administrative agencies charged with enforcement of antitrust laws". Chief Justice Robers noted in a concurring opinion "Much of the economic literature … sort of sweeps aside the particular question today because it rejects the notion of tying as a problem in the first place". For a full discussion see a useful presentation by the Federal Trade Commission (www.ftc.gov/os/sectiontwohearings/docs/DonaldRussellpresentation.pdf). (e) The intellectual wave crested last year when a number of commentators attacked the underlying foundation for the government's regulation of securities products markets by suggesting the Sherman Antitrust Act had been based on a misconception. In this view, Standard Oil was not a rapacious monopolist that needed to be restrained but a remarkable engine of social progress engaged in Schumpterian "creative destruction". In particular, the counter-revolutionaries noted that Standard Oil built its monopoly by supplying cheap gasoline and other products at generally declining prices. Standard Oil might have wanted to make everyone buy its products and drive out the competition, but they were cheap products with prices declining in real terms. The Sherman Antitrust Act was a remedy for a non-existent market failure. (f) Very gingerly, some commentators have even begun to take issue with the intellectual foundation of securities laws, in particular the prohibition on insider trading, arguing that for markets to be efficient they must incorporate all information -- inside information as well as the publicly available sort. If insiders and others with special insight are prohibited from trading on that information, prices will not reflect all the available data and the only traders in the market will be those with no particular expertise. THE CFTC AT THE HEART OF THE STORM The Commission is actually a rather small agency within the federal government of only secondary importance. For the current fiscal year (Oct 2007-Sep 2008), the Commission budget is just $116 million and it has a full-time equivalent staff of 475. In contrast, the SEC has a budget of $966 million (and collects more than $5 billion in user fees) with a staff of more than 3,300, while the Fed has an operating budget of more than $4 billion and over 19,000 staff (most at the regional banks involved in oversight and transaction processing). The CFTC has its origins in the massive reorganisation of the federal government in 1974 as a new agency charged with enforcing existing laws more effectively. Its original remit was largely restricted to agricultural commodities (grains and livestock) since these were the main items traded on futures exchanges at the time. It's remit grew to cover trading in crude, energy and other futures contracts almost by accident as these markets were established in the 1970s and 1980s because it was the existing regulator for commodity exchanges. The massive growth in energy futures markets during the 1990s and 2000s has transformed the agency from an agricultural futures commission the primary regulator of the country's energy markets, but it has not been matched by any comparable increase in staffing and resources, or any real increase in the agency's status. In the late 1990s, the CFTC sought to extend its remit to include all futures trading (including financial futures) and to extend its regulatory powers to cover over-the-counter markets as well as trading on organised exchanges. CFTC Chairwoman Brooksley Born was brutally rebuffed by the other larger agencies which argued that it should not regulate non-commodity contracts and that OTC trading did not need to be subject to the same type of oversight as exchange-based trading. The Commission and its leadership were humiliated by the combined power of the Fed, Treasury and SEC, and forced to retreat. Under the Bush administration, the CFTC has rehabitiliated itself and emerged as a much more significant, if still second-rank, player in the regulatory system. In particular, the CFTC improved relations with the industries it regulated and pioneered an industry-friendly, principles-based, light-touch approach to regulation that was compared favourably with the same approach being fostered in the United Kingdom by the Financial Services Authority, and at the same time contrasted with the rules-based prescriptive system still employed by the SEC. The CFTC came to be portrayed as the regulator of choice and the SEC has come under pressure to remodel itself along CFTC-lines. The CFTC now enjoys close relations with the futures industry. Despite bringing high profile enforcement actions against a leading energy company for attempted manipulation of futures markets in gasoline and propane, the CFTC has generally defended the industry against allegations that trading is distorting commodities prices and has supported research showing that commodity futures contracts help diversify investors portfolios. As recently as 20 May 2008, CFTC Chief Economist Jeffrey Harris testified to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs "there is little economic evidence to demonstrate that prices are being systematically driven by speculators in these markets … Simply put, the economic data shows that overall commodity price levels, including agriculture commodity and energy futures prices, are being driven by powerful fundamental economic forces and the laws of supply and demand …. Together these fundamental economic factors have formed a 'perfect storm' that is causing significant upward pressure on futures prices across the board" (see http://www.cftc.gov/stellent/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/speechandtestimony/oeajeffharristestimony052008.pdf). The CFTC has rejected the idea that investors have had any material impact on commodity prices noting that: (i) Prices have risen sharply for commodities that do not have developed futures markets (durum wheat, steel, iron ore, coal) and are not part of any commodity index (Minneapolis wheat and Chicago rice) (ii) Markets where index trading accounts for the highest share of open interest (hogs and cattle) have actually suffered falling prices this year (iii) The share of non-commercial traders in agricultural and oil futures markets has remained fairly constant But as crude oil prices have continued to surge, the CFTC's position has become harder to sustain politically. Critics in Congress have stepped up pressure on the agency. The Energy Independence and Security Act (2007) gave the rival Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rule-making and enforcement authority to prevent any person from directly or indirectly (1) using or employment any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance; (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of crude oil, gasoline or distillates at wholesale; (3) that violates a rule or regulation that the Federal Trade Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of the citizens of the United States (section 811 EISA as reported the Federal Register). More recently, oversight committees of the House of Representatives and Senate have been pushing the FTC to act more aggressively in the wholesale energy markets and investigate them for any signs of abuse. There is a clear threat: if the CFTC will not or cannot come up with evidence of market manipulation, the job will be given to another agency. Like a lawyer forum shopping for a friendly court that will render a decision favourable to its client, Congress is now searching for a regulatory agency which will come up with the "right" answer. Several congressional committees have recently held high-profile hearings on the participation of investment money in commodity markets and invited high-profile and reputable speakers from within the energy and investment communities to testify (including hedge fund financier George Soros). The intention has clearly been to lay out the intellectual case for investment money influencing commodity prices and therefore force the CFTC to reconsider the evidence and its position. The CFTC is also being pressurised by producing countries. OPEC has repeatedly blamed soaring oil prices on "speculation" rather than fundamentals. The cartel has pointed to ample inventories of crude oil around the world and plentiful spare capacity. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly promised to make more crude oil available if anyone turns up with a tanker to collect it, and recently promised visiting President George W Bush it would make another 300,000 b/d available. UAE Oil Minister Mohammd al-Hamli yesterday denounced $10 one-day price swings as "crazy" and unrelated to fundamentals. He went on to note the UAE has spare capacity and is "quite happy" to supply more oil if called upon. So far, no one is rushing tankers to the Gulf region to pick up extra Saudi or UAE crude. In fact, US refiners have cut throughput and demand for crude oil this spring in an attempt to run down excess stocks of gasoline. With prices continuing to surge despite plentiful offers of phyiscal crude to the market, it is becoming harder to justify rising prices on the basis of near-term supply-demand balances. THE CFTC SHIFTS POSITION The political pressure to act against high commodity prices has finally become overwhelming. On 29 May 2008, the CFTC announced "Multiple Energy Market Initiatives": (1) Expanded surveillance of the crude oil market through enhanced information sharing and disclosure with the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom and the Intercontinental Commodity Exchange (ICE) in London. (2) Stepped up reporting of large positions especially large index positions in crude oil and other energy markets -- with the possibility that the CFTC will start to publish a separate breakdown for for index traders as alongside the traditional classification of commercial and non-commercial traders in the weekly COT reports. CFTC has been publishing a separate report on commodity index traders for agricultural contracts since 2006 in response to concerns that large index positions were distorting these relatively small and illiquid markets. The CFTC decided against publishing a similar report for the larger industrial and energy markets on the basis that they were sufficiently large and liquid that index positions would not have a similar impact. But this decision now appears to be under review. (3) The Commission disclosed the existence (previously reported but not acknowledged) of a detailed investigation into crude oil physical and futures trading launched last autumn and covering several years from the mid-2000s to the present. Acting CFTC Chairman Walter Lukken and CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton have both made comments in recent days indicating the CFTC will conduct more intense scrutiny of market movements and is open to a more aggressive and interventionist approach. Lukken commented yesterday "The CFTC is commited to ensuring that our nation's futures markets operate fairly and efficiently, and that commodity prices are determined by the fundamental forces of supply and demand, rather than by abusive or manipulative practices". The CFTC has also promised to slow down granting new exemptions to foreign futures exchanges and to review the hedging exemptions which allow physical traders (but also many financial institutions) to run positions larger than the normal position accountability limits imposed on futures exchanges. Finally, the exemptions for OTC trading and trading in London created by previous legislation appear to be under active review. THE CFTC'S INTELLECTUAL PROBLEM -- AND THE CALL FOR REINFORCEMENTS The main problem for the CFTC is to disentangle two very different types of behaviour. The CFTC has always maintained a fairly clear prohibition on "abusive" and "manipulative" behaviour such as insider dealing, the abuse of dominant positions, or the manipulation of the physical basis to create an artificial shortage of the deliverable commodity. Recent squeezes of the gasoline and propane markets have drawn a sharp regulatory response (including substantial fines and the imposition of an independent overseer in trading rooms to monitor compliance practices). The CFTC is also pursuing the collapsed Amaranth hedge fund and its former star trader for practices in the natural gas market which it considers unacceptable. But the question of how to deal with very large positions (single or collective) which do not intend to distort market prices but which may have the same unintended effect because of their scale relative to the underlying market is more complicated. The principle of freedom to contract suggests there should be no limits on the size of positions which an individual or a group of individuals are allowed to run in a futures market, provided those positions are not run in a manner which is "abusive" or "manipulative" (Lukken's words). But the Commission has already made some crucial exceptions to this principle: (1) Most futures markets impose limits on the size of positions that may be run in both the prompt month and across all forward months. Investors are not free to run positions of any size they like -- a recognition that large positions can become problematic whether or not this is the intention. The CFTC has exempted physical hedgers from these limitations, and has allowed many banks and financial institutions to "hedge" their OTC and index exposure in the public futures markets by classifying them as "commercial" rather than "non-commercial" users and allowed them to make use of the standard hedging exemptions to the usual position limits. But this is a carve out. In general, the CFTC's position limits qualify the right to hold positions of any size. (2) The CFTC has already acknowledged the potential for large positions to unintentionally distort small and illiquid markets when it mandated separate reporting for index positions in the agricultural futures markets. (3) The CFTC took action against the Hunt Brothers to require them to reduce the scale of their holdings in the silver market. The CFTC is now under pressure to limit the size of investment positions in the crude oil and other commodity markets to prevent them being "artificially inflated" by the inflow of money. There are various proposals currently circulating which would eliminate some of the hedging exemptions, toughen position limits, aggregate position limits across markets (NYMEX, ICE and OTC) or remove the hedging exemptions for swaps and index traders which enable them to run substantial positions on the public markets to offset large OTC index positions off-market. But this would mark a radical departure from past practice and a huge departure from the current market and regulatory philosophy: (1) Previous efforts to restrict the size of positions have focused on preventing a single individual or a group of individuals acting in concert from amassing a large position which has the effect, intentional or not, of distorting the market. But there is no suggestion that is what is happening here. The problem is not the emergence of a single large position or a group of colluding position. Instead the problem is the collective (long) position of a whole series of banks and other institutions each of which has (indepedently) chosen to run a substantial long position in the market. It is a substantial extension of the principle to penalise each of these individuals for the (perfectly rational) behaviour of the group. (2) The dominant intellectual paradigm, grounded in the efficient markets hypothesis, suggests that speculative activity increases the liquidity of the market, improves price discovery and makes it eaiser for physical users to hedge exposures and manage risks. CFTC intervention to limit the positions of index traders and other financial institutions would almost certainly reduce futures turnover and open interest. It would arguably reduce liquidity. NYMEX CEO James Newsome has already warned that imposing tougher position limits on US exchanges would simply drive business offshore to futures exchanges in London, the Middle East and Asia. It would mark an intellectual turning point -- a fundamental breach with the deregulatory counter-revolution that has been in place since the early 1980s and a return to the more dirigiste model that dominated from the 1930s to the 1970s. The CFTC lacks the political authority to take such a radical move on its own. So it is notable that the CFTC has now invited more powerful agencies to join its investigation into energy markets. The US Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the SEC (all members of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets) plus the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy and the Department of Agriculture have been invited to join the CFTC in a wide-ranging probe into what is driving the markets. The Treasury and the Fed are instinctively hostile to attempts to interfere in the free working of financial markets. BUT if the CFTC eventually takes action to limit investor positions in commodity contracts or impose other "unorthodox" measures designed to limit the run up in prices, it will need intellectual and political support from these more powerful agencies. Equally, if the CFTC eventually decides to resist calls for tighter regulation it will need support to resist the backlash from Congress. PRESSURE BUILDING FOR AN EARLY RESPONSE The United States Congress is a remarkable institution. Proposed legislation can languish for months or even years, then be enacted very rapidly when the logjam bursts or a deadline looms. Congress really only has two speeds: Dead Stop, and Full Speed Ahead. Congress is now mulling a series of possible measures designed to limit investment inflows to commodity markets with the intention of lowering prices. Position limits could be toughened, the OTC markets could be brought under CFTC oversight and made subject to the same limits, margins raised, or the tax treatment of commodity investments by pension funds could be altered to make them less attractuve (the last proposal has been advocated by Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut). The question is whether any of these solutions will gain traction. But there are several reasons to think that legislative action might emerge from Congress more swiftly than once seemed likely: (1) Congress will aim to wrap up most legislative business by the end of Sep or early Oct so members can return to their districts and states to campaign for elections at the beginning of Nov. So if legislation is not passed before the end of Sep, there will not be another window of opportunity until Congress reassembles in late Jan 2009. (2) Legislators are under intense pressure to respond to surging energy prices and reduce the strain on household budgets. (3) The Congressional Republican Party is in deep trouble. Republicans have already lost three previously safe seats in the House of Representatives during special elections this year, and the party is braced for heavy losses at the election in Nov. Recent estimates by non-partisan tracking organisations such as the Cook Report suggest as many as 45-75 House seats could become genuinely contestable this year (up sharply compared with previous cycles when incumbency and gerrymandering have rendered almost all seats safe for their current holders and parties). Most of these seats are in Republican-leaning areas. The party's National Republican Campaign Committee (NRCC) which helps fund House races has just $6 million of free cash on hand, compared to more than $40 million for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee. Even in the upper house, there is mounting speculation that the Republican Party will lose a significant number of seats, and that Democrats could get very close to holding 60 seats after Nov. The Senate is currently split 50-49-1 (with independent Senator Lieberman caucusing with the Democrats to give them a one-seat 51-49 majority over the Republicans. The real majority in the Senate is 60 votes, not 51, since this enables the majority to end debate and move to a vote on any question, curtailing the upper chamber's famous right to unlimited debate. If the Democrats obtain, or get close to 60 votes, they will achieve total control over the legislative agenda of both houses and leave Republican senators as by-standers in the process. (4) Congressional Republicans will be deeply reluctant to be cast as defenders of "Wall Street" speculators against the interest of "Main Street" families in what is already a very difficult election season. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, a Republican representing the state of Texas (!), said yesterday: "There is something wrong with the cost of a barrel of oil, even with all of the fees and taxes…. There has got to be a speculation-in-the-futures-market part of that that we ought to be able to do something about …. I think we could come to a bipartisan consensus about it". There are indications Senator Hutchison might be prepared to accept tigher market regulations if this was paired with an easing of restrictions on domestic exploration and development. (5) Any legislation would need to circumvent a potential veto by the White House. But two opportunities present themselves in the run up to the elections: (a) Congressional Republicans are unlikely to want to be cast by their Democratic opponents as favouring expensive speculative oil in an already charged election season. If enough decide to back Democratic efforts to tighten regulation, perhaps as part of a bipartisan bill that also including some Republican objectives such as increased drilling, legislation could easily emerge from Congress by veto-proof two-thirds majorities in both houses. (b) Provisions changing the tax treatment of pension fund investments in commodities or mandating other changes in futures markets could be inserted into the must-pass appropriations bills that need to clear Congress by the start of the new fiscal year on Oct 1. With an election looming, neither side will want an extended showdown over the budget dragging on into Oct and Nov. The White House might find itself presented with some unpalatable changes in commodities laws as part of an omnibus budget bill which it would find hard to veto, or where a veto would be hard to sustain. So there is a real risk if commodity prices continue escalating over the summer towards $150 or even higher, the pressure for a legislative response in Sep might become overwhelming. May 29 2008语录有点火星了,但是权作记录之用 001.老鼠一发威,大家都是病猫。 |
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